Over the years, differing perspectives on social exchange have evolved, bridging disciples such as anthropology, sociology, organizational theory, and social psychology. As a result, social exchange theory cannot be thought of as a single theoretical model. Rather, it is a general framework or conceptual point of view about how resources are valued and exchanged. Thus, there is no single social exchange theory but many different social exchange theories, each meaningfully elaborating on the general paradigm.
References and Further Reading 1. The philosophical and political notion of recognition predominantly refers to 3and is often taken to mean that not only is recognition an important means of valuing or respecting another person, it is also fundamental to understanding ourselves.
Here A and B indicate two individual persons, specifically A is the recogniser and B the recognisee. For example, I may recognise you as a person possessing certain rights and responsibilities in light of your being an autonomous, rational human being for more on defining the structure of recognition, see Laitinen, This means that we must place sufficient value in the recogniser in order for their attitude towards us to count as recognitive.
Brandom approaches this idea through the idea of authority, arguing that a genuine instance of recognition requires that we authorise someone to confer recognition. Similarly, one can gain authority and responsibility by petitioning others for recognition.
Consequently, one has authority only insofar as one is recognised as authoritative. We may not consider being valued by a wilful criminal as any sort of recognition in the sense being defined here. We do not judge them capable of conferring value on us, as we do not accord any value or respect to them.
Similarly, someone who is coerced into recognising us may also fail to count as a relevant judge. A king who demands recognition of his superiority from all his subjects, simply in virtue of his being king, and threatens to punish them if they disobey, does not receive any meaningful kind of recognition for the subjects do not genuinely choose to confer value on him.
Thus, in recognising another, we must also be recognised as a subject capable of giving recognition.
This indicates that reciprocity or mutuality is likely to be a necessary condition of appropriate recognition for a discussion of this point, see Laden, A further issue in defining recognition is whether it is generative or responsive Laitinen, ; Markell, A generation-model of recognition focuses on the ways in which recognition produces or generates reasons for actions or self-understandings.
This is to say that someone ought to act in a certain way in virtue of being recognised as, for example, recognising someone as a rational being will generate certain duties and responsibilities for both the person being recognised and those who interact with him.
A response-model of recognition focuses on the ways in which recognition acknowledges pre-existing features of a person.
Here, to recognise someone is to acknowledge them as they already really are Appiah, This means that there are reasons why one ought to give recognition to someone prior to the act of recognition itself. The demand for recognition in a response-model is produced and justified through pre-existing characteristics of a person, whilst in the generation-model it is the act of recognition itself which confers those characteristics onto a person through their being recognised as such.
A third issue is whether groups or collectives can count as recognisers and recognisees. For example, when speaking of recognising a particular cultural group, do we mean we recognise that group qua a group, or as a collection of individuals?
Similarly, does the granting of certain rights or respect apply to the group itself or the individual members belonging to that group? For a detailed discussion and defence of group-differentiated minority rights, see Kymlicka, These questions revolve, at least in part, around the ontological status afforded to groups or collectives.
Advocates of a politics of recognition are not always clear regarding whether or not groups can be granted recognition. Debates over the legitimacy or sovereignty of a state may depend upon the extent to which we recognise it as legitimate or sovereign. Important discussions of groups as entities include TuomelaJones and List and Pettit However, as yet there has been little analysis of the connection between recognition and the ontology of groups.
Charles Taylor argues for the importance of collective rights, but gives little consideration to whether collectives are genuine subjects over-and-above the individuals that constitute them. In his more recent work, Axel Honneth Fraser and Honneth Common to all social and political notions of recognition is the shift from an atomistic to an intersubjective, dialogical understanding of the individual.
Because our identity is shaped precisely through our relations to others, our being recognised by them, feelings of self-worth, self-respect and self-esteem are possible only if we are positively recognised for who we are.
To this extent, theories of political recognition, which were first formulated in the s, developed out of political movements centred upon such concepts as gender, sexuality, race, ethnicity and culture. Recognition, according to Tayloris an indispensible means of understanding and justifying the demands of these identity movements, which have had a major impact on society, particularly from the s onwards.
Consequently, for many political theorists, recognition is an integral component of any satisfactory modern theory of justice as well as the means by which both historical and contemporary political struggles can be understood and justified. Against this trend there emerged a strongly intersubjective conception of selfhood that found expression through the concept of recognition, the founder of which is typically identified as Hegel.
Although Hegel has undoubtedly influenced the contemporary understanding of recognition more than any other philosopher, Hegel was himself inspired by the work of Johann Fichte see Williams, This is to say, the individual must acknowledge the claims of other free individuals in order to understand itself as a being capable of action and possessing freedom.
A key feature of this idea is that the same applies in reverse — the other can only comprehend itself as free by being recognised as such.Discusses some differences among social exchange theory, and the reciprocity and social responsibility norms, and which best explains helping behavior, and why.
Social exchange theory is a social psychological and sociological perspective that explains social change and stability as a process of negotiated exchanges between parties. Social exchange theory posits that human relationships are formed by the use of a subjective cost-benefit analysis and the comparison of alternatives.
The theory has roots in economics, psychology and sociology. (Social Responsibility Norm): We feel the need to help those who are deserving, regardless of their ability to reciprocate.
In both cases these norms are applicable to other cultures. Also, both theorize that human interactions are transactions that aim to maximize one's rewards and minimize one's costs.
social-exchange theory, reciprocity norm, and social-responsibility norm - can evaluate theories according to the ways in which they characterize prosocial behavior as based on tit-for-tat or after-the-fact reasoning, but they do provide a coherent scheme for summarizing observations of prosocial behavior.
Social exchange theory is one of the most influential conceptual paradigms for understanding behavior. Over the years, differing perspectives on social exchange have evolved, bridging disciples such as anthropology, sociology, organizational theory, and social psychology.
Egalitarianism is a trend of thought in political philosophy. An egalitarian favors equality of some sort: People should get the same, or be treated the same, or be treated as equals, in some respect.